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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE O·F UTAH

AUDREY E. MASTERS,
Plaintiff a.nd Respondent,
-vs.-

Case
No. 9574

MAXINE LESEUER,
Defenda.nt and Appellan,t.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

NATURE OF CASE
The instant appeal by defendant is from an order
of the Third Judicial District Court denying the defendant's motion to set aside the default judgment theretofore entered by the Court in favor of plaintiff.

DISPOSITION OF CASE IN LOWER COURT
The respondent commenced action against appellant
for the recovery of certain real property wrongfully re-
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possessed by the appellant, upon claim by appellant that
the respondent had failed to comply with the terms of a
contract of sale of said real property from defendant to
plaintiff. Thereafter, the defendant's default was entered and subsequently, after hearing before the Honorable A. H. Ellett, a judgment was entered awarding
the return of the property to plaintiff. Thereafter, the
defendant filed a motion to set aside the judgment which
was heard before Judge Ellett, and the motion was
denied. The defendant now appeals from the denial of
that motion.

NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The plaintiff-respondent seeks the affirmance of the
Trial Judge's refusal to set aside the judgment in favor
of respondent.
FACTS
The respondent takes exception to the facts contained in the appellant's brief. 1
On May 26, 1961, the respondent filed an action, in the
Third District Court of Salt Lake County, against the
appellant alleging the appellant had wrongfully repossessed the property at 603-604 Cortez, Salt Lake City,
which property the appellant agreed to sell the respondent on January 9, 1959 (R-1). It was further alleged that
respondent had made all payments required under the
1 Appellant's brief contains no citation to the record in support of the
"alleged facts."
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contract to the date of repossession, November 7, 1960,
and that subsequent tender of payments had been rejected by appellant (R-1). It was also alleged that subsequent to repossession, the appellant's attorney had been
contacted by respondent's attorney relative to an accounting, anct that after being assured that the information
would be forthcoming, the appellant refused to provide
such information (R-2). The record supports the failure
of the appellant to supply the information requested,
since at the hearing on the judgment (R-6), Mr. Richard
Dewsnup, attorney for respondent prior to the ltigation,
testified he had conversations with Norman Wade, appellant's attorney, who agreed to supply the information on
the accounting of the contract, and followed the conversation with a letter confirming their previous discussion
and setting out the information desired. (Exhibit 2, p.
11 et. seq.; R-8) The- information was never supplied
(R-8, 9), and a follow-up letter was sent on April 7,
1961. (Exhibit 3, p. 11 et. seq.) Subsequent to the April
7th letter, a conversation was had between Mr. Dewsnup
and Mr. Wade wherein Mr_$. Dewsnup informed Mr.
Wade that if he could not supply the information, a law
suit would have to be filed. Mr. Wade indicated appellant
was uncooperative, and the law suit was filed by respondent (R-9).
Summons was served on the appellant on the 7th day
of July, 1961, (R-4, 5), and thereafter the appellant's default was entered on August 1, 1961, twenty-three
days later.

About a week after the appellant's de3
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fault was entered, Mr. Dewsnup saw Mr. Wade, appellant's attorney, and the following took place (R-10):
''Approximately two weeks ago, I saw him at the
elevator in this building, and I asked him if he had
had any further contact with Mrs. LeSeuer, because suit had been filed, and I asked him if he had
been engaged to make any kind of an appearance,
and his answer was rather vague. He said something to the effect that he ought to make an appearance in it, and I advised him at that time that you
were the one that was handling the action, that you
had taken a default judgment, that you would probably resist the setting aside of the default, and that
you were planning on bringing Mrs. Masters down
from Washington within the near future to introduce evidence in support of the default.''
Thereafter, on the 21st of August, 1961, a hearing for
judgment upon the plaintiff's complaint was had before
the Honorable A. H. Ellett (R-6). Evidence was presented in support of the complaint through Mrs. Audrey E.
Masters, respondent, a resident of Seattle, Washington,
who journeyed from Washington to testify; through a
Mr. Atkinson, a real estate agent; and from Nir. Dewsnup.
Thereafter on the 24th day of August, 1961, the Court entered judgment upon the evidence awarding return of the
premises to the respondent and other relief ( R-1'7).
On September 11, 1961, the appellant filed a motion
to set aside the judgment (R-20), with an answer and an
affidavit from the appellant's counsel, in support of the
motion (R-21). The affidavit claimed that the reason no
answer had been previously filed was that affiant thought
that one had been filed, and was unaware that one had not
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been filed, until his client notified him on September 1,
1961, that judgment had been entered. A hearing was
held on the appellant's motion to set aside the judgment
on September 28, 1961, and the motion was denied by the
Honorable A. H. Ellett, the same judge that had heard
the evidence on plaintiff's complaint for judgment (R-23).
The notice of appeal was filed by appellant on October 31,
1961 ; the record on appeal was filed with this Court on
December 8, 1961 ; and appellant's brief was filed on
April 13, 1962.
Further, the Appendix to this brief shows that subsequent to the judgment in the District Court, the respondent took possession of the premises at 603-604 Cortez Street and made payments to a third party on the
mortgage on said property to the present time.

1\JRGUMENT

The Trial Judge Did Not Abuse His Discretion in Denying the Appellant's Motion to Set
Aside the Judgment Since:
(A) Equity Required the Motion Be Denied.
(B) Mistake, Inadvertence or Excusable

Neglect Were Not Clearly Dem.on,strated to the Court.
(A) Equity Required the Appellant's Motion Be Denied

Rule 55, U. R. C. P. provides for the entry of default
judgments. In accordance with 55 (b) (2) U. R. C. P., a
u
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judgment of the nature taken in the instant case must be
entered by the Court. In keeping with that mandate, the
plaintiff upon full hearing before the trial judge (R-12),
some twenty days after the appellant's default had been
entered, was accorded judgment. The plaintiff, an elderly
lady, resident of Seattle, Washington, came to Salt Lake
City to give testimony. Two other witnesses were called
and gave testimony. Prior to the time of the hearing,
Mr. Dewsnup informed the appellant's attorney that a
default had been entered, the attorney indicated he knew
he ought to make an appearance and was informed that
plaintiff intended to proceed to hearing and judgment
(R-10). The defendant's attorney was further informed
that Mrs. Masters would journey from Washington to
Salt Lake for the purpose of testifying. The defendant did
nothing, took no action to set aside the default, contact
the plaintiff's attorney, or otherwise evidence an interest in the case. It was not until over a month later, after
judgment had been entered and plaintiff had been put to
considerable time and expense, that the defendant made
any effort to appear in the case. At that time, a motion
to set aside the judgment was filed, based upon an affidavit which was directly contrary to the facts as testified
to at the time of the judgment hearing (R-10, 21-22).
Further, prior to the commencement of any action,
the defendant's promises to supply information in support of an accounting were not kept (Exhibits 2 and 3),
and the defendant's attorney indicated that defendant
was recalcitrant and uncooperative.
6
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Rule 55, U. R. C. P., provides that for good cause
shown, a default may be set aside, but that a default judgment is governed by Rule 60 (b), U. R. C. P. Thus, a
firm distinction exists between the setting aside of a
mere default, where only good cause need be shown, and
disturbing a judgment. Teal v. King Farms Co., 21 F. R.
Serv., 55 c. 1, Case 1 (1955). Rule 60 (b), U. R. C. P.
sets out the instances when relief from final judgment is
warranted. The over-all command of that rule is that
the relief should only be granted ''in the furtherance of
Justice.'' As has previously been noted by the Court, N ey
v. Ha.rrison, 5 Utah 2d 217, 299 P. 2d 1114 (1956), Rule
60 (b) is similar to previous Utah statutes, 2 and hence
earlier decisions of the Court under other statutes are
valid precedent.
It is clear that as a general rule, the trial judge to
whom the motion is addressed has discretion to grant or
deny relief from judgment. In Cutler v. Haycock, 32 Utah
354, 90 Pac. 897 (1907), this Court stated :
''That the question whether a default mid judgment should or should not be vacated is one to be
passed on by the trial court, and that it rests
within its sound discretion, has so often been declared to be the rule of practice that it has become
elementary, and needs no citation of authorities.''
Most recently the Court has affirmed the recognized
rule, that the ''sound discretion'' of the trial judge should
govern. Jewell v. Horner, 12 Utah 2d 328, 366 P. 2d 594
(1961). Before the appellate court would be warranted
2 Comp. Laws, 1876 § 1293; Rev. Stat. 1898, § 3005; Comp. Laws, 1917,
§ 6619; 104-14-4 Rev. Stat., 1933; 104-14-4 U. C. A., 1943.
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in reversing the trial court's determination, an abuse of
discretion must be shown. Thus, in Salt Lake Hardware
Co. v. Neilson Lwnd & Water Co., 43 Utah 406, 134 Pac. 911
(1913), the Court stated:
"The rule in this jurisdiction is that we are not
justified in interfering with and setting aside such
an order as this, denying relief on alleged grounds
of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect, unelss an abuse of discretion is shown.''
In McWhirter v. Donaldson, 36 Utah 300, 104 Pac.
731 (1909), it was clearly stated:
'' ... unless it is made to appear that such discretion has been abused, the ruling of the Court vacating or refusing to vacate the judgment will
not be disturbed on appeal."
Thus, before the Court should act to set aside the
trial court's order, it must appear that Judge Ellett
abused his discretion in the matter, based upon the facts
known to him in this particular case, Utah Commercial
Ba,nk v. Trumbo, 17 Utah 199, 53 Pac. 1033 (1898). 3
Where relief is to be granted, it is to be granted to
effect justice. Hurd v. Ford, 74 Utah 46, 276 Pac. 908
(1929). Thus, in a careful analysis of the Rule 60 (b) and
the purposes for it, the Court noted in Warren v. Dixon
Ranch Company, 123 Utah 416, 260 P. 2d 711 (1953):
"The allowance of a vacation of judgment is a
creature of equity designed to relieve against
harshness of enforcing a judgment, which may
3 "No general rule can be laid down respecting the discretion to be exercised in setting aside or refusing to set aside a judgment by default . . . Each
case must necessarily depend upon its own peculiar facts and circumstances . . ."
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through procedural difficulties, the wrongs of the
opposing party, or misfortunes which prevent the
presentation of a claim or defense [arise].

* * *
''Discretion must be exercised in furtherance of
justice and the Court will incline toward granting
relief in a doubtful case to the end that the party
may have a hearing, Hurd v. Ford, 74 Utah 46,
276 P. 908. However, the mova;nt must show that
he has used due diligence and that he was prevented from appearing by circumstances over
which he ha,d no control.' ' 4 (Emphasis supplied)
The Utah precedent is fairly well marshaled in
support of a position favoring liberality in granting
relief from default judgments, and holding it to be an
abuse of discretion not to so allow, where meritorious
reasons are set out, and timely application is made therefore. Bylund v. Crook,. 60 Utah 285, 208 Pac. 504 (1922);
Chrysler v. Chrysler, 5 Utah 2d 415, 303 P. 2d 995 (1956);
Kelly v. Scott, 5 Utah 2d 159, 298 P. 2d 821 (1956). However, an analysis of the cases, as against the facts of the
instant case, clearly demonstrate that appellant is entitled to no relief.
In Utah Commercial Barnk v. Trumbo, 17 Utah 198,
53 Pac. 1033 ( 1898), the Supreme Court reversed the
trial court's denial of a motion to set aside a default
judgment. The affidavits in support of the motion were
uncontradicted. In addition, defendant had made an appearance in the case to quash summons, which was
denied. Thereafter, counsel withdrew, but defendant had
4

Quoted with approval in Ney v. Harrison, supra.
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no notice of withdrawal, but thereafter employed counsel
and sought to defend the action. The case is substantially at variance from the instant case. Here, defendant
~ad first promised to furnish an accounting without trial,
but refused to do so. Defendant, through counsel, was
informed that a default had been taken and acknowledged
that suit had been filed. Thereafter, being aware that
plaintiff intended to proceed to judgment, no effort was
made to enter the case. On this basis, the Trumbo case
will not support relief from the trial court's discretion.
In Cutler v. Haycock, 32 Utah 354, 99 Pac. 897 (1907),
the Court again found an abuse of discretion in not setting aside a default. But once again it clearly appeared
that defendant sought to force the action, and was not
dilatory in pursuing the court procedures. The facts
of the Haycock case disclose that on the day for filing an
answer the defendant's attorney left a demurrer at the
office of plaintiff's attorney which due to the inadequacy
of communication was not filed in the clerk's office until
a few days later. The Supreme Court felt that in view
of the remoteness of the defendant's attorney's office
and the Court, plus the slight delay involved, the judgment should have been set aside. The differences between that case and the instant situation are so obvious
as not to· warrant mention. The case offers no support
for the appellant's plea for relief.
In Hurd v. Ford, 74 Utah 46, 276 P. 908 (1929), the
Supreme Court again granted relief as against the trial
court's decision. But the basis upon which the relief was
accorded is not present in the instant case, since subse- ·
10
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quently, in Warren v. Dixon Rooch Co., 123 Utah 415,
260 P. 2d 741 ( 1953), a case wherein the Court refused
relief, it said in reference to the I-Iurd case:
"In Hurd v. Ford, the reversal was based upon
these considerations: a motion to make more definite had been filed within the time for answering,
the default judgment for attorney's fees had been
entered on an unliquidated amount and no evidence of a reasonable fee had been taken, and further the Court acted beyond its power in requiring plaintiff to turn over documents in her possession as a condition for vacating the judgment.''
From the Court's construction of the Hurd case, it's
clear that it has no application to the instant situation.
In the Warren v. Dixon Ranch case, supra, the Court further said as to the basis for reversal of the I-I aycock
case noted above:
''In Cutler v. Haycock, a case decided in 1907,
this Court reversed the trial court because it felt
that in determining not to set aside the judgment
the trial court had not exercised its discretion because of Peterson v. Crosier, and would otherwise
have granted the motion inasmuch as plaintiff
had used every possible means to present his defense but was prevented by the physical difficulties of communication in a sparsely-settled
country.''
It can be clearly seen that something more than what
is now before the Court is required in order to warrant
setting aside a judgment in the interest of justice. 5
5 In Kelly v. Scott, 5 Utah 2d 159, 298 P. 2d 821 (1956), the Court
granted relief, but it was based upon Rule 60 (b) (6) not here involved.
Thomas v. Moms, 8 Utah 284, 31 Pac. 446 (1892) involved granting relief
from a default, but it was trial default since an answer had been filed. To the
same effect is Machine Co. V. MtWchant, 11 Utah 68, 39 Pac. 483 ( 1895).
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An analysis of the cases in which the Court has refused to grant relief clearly demonstrates that the instant
fact situation fits that category.
In Peterson v. Crosier, 29 Utah 235, 81 Pac. 860
(1905), the Supreme Court refused to disturb the trial
court's decision not to relieve defendant from a default.
In the case, defendant had filed a demurrer to plaintiff's
complaint which was overruled. Defendant also filed an
answer, but failed to appear at trial. It was alleged that
the neglect of plaintiff's attorney was partly responsible
in the failure of the defendant to appear at trial. The
Court in rejecting the claim stated:
''The facts set out in appellant's affidavit wholly
fail to bring the case within the foregoing provision of the statute [3005 R. S., 1898]. On the contrary, they tend to show a deliberate intention on
his part to abandon his defense and permit plaintiff to take judgment against him. He and his
counsel were advised that the case would be called
for trial on the day for which it was set, and he
must have known that, unless he appeared and
made his defense or obtained a continuance, a
judgment, in all probability would be rendered
against him; but, instead of preparing and appearing for trial, he showed an indifference which is
wholly inexcusable.''
Parallels between this case and the instant case
appear of record. Appellant was given full opportunity
before suit to settle the case, but refused to cooperate.
Thereafter, suit was commenced, and appellant had
knowledge of the suit. After failure to file an answer,
default was taken. Thereafter, the appellant's counsel
12
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was notified of the default, acknowledged the necessity
of an appearance, but no effort was made to seek a stipulation from counsel or remove the default. Not until well
over a month after notice did the appellant seek relief.
It could well be concluded that defendant did not desire
to proceed with the action. Further, the fact that only defendant's attorney was notified is no excuse, for the Court
said in Peterson v. Crosier, supra (P. 245 Utah) :
"But even if it be conceded that appellant's failure to appear and defend at the trial was due to
the neglect of his attorney, it could avail him nothing, for the rule is settled by the great weight of
authority that 'the facts alleged must be inconsistent with the least neglect, incompetency or
ignorance in the conduct of the suit on the part of
the complainant, or on the part of his attorney or
agent, the acts or omissions of whom are no more
a ground for excuse than his own.' " (Emphasis
supplied)
In a similar case, McWhirter v. Donaldson, 36 Utah 293,
104 Pac. 731 (1909), the Court refused to grant relief
from default judgment where the defendant did not file
an answer, and upon withdrawal of counsel, defendant's
attorney was informed he would ''push the case,'' and
thereafter default was taken. In the instant case, default
judgment was not taken until from two to three weeks
after the conversation with appellant's attorney in the
elevator. A close paralled to the McWhirter case exists in
the instant appeal. In denying relief, the Court said:
'' ... a party ... must show that he has used due
diligence to prepare and present his defense, and
that he was either prevented from doing so because
13
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of some accident, misfortune, or circumstance
over which he has no control; or that he has been
misled or lulled into inaction by some agreement
or act of the opposite party or his counsel upon
which he had a right to rely. This appellant has
wholly failed to do (Peterson v. Crosier, 29 Utah
235, 81 Pac. 860). ''
The words are equally apropos to the instant case. A
case equally similar to the McWhirter case is Salt Lake
Ha,rdwa.re Co. v. Neilson L(JJY/;.d & Water Co., 43 Utah 406,
134 Pac. 911 (1913), again involving notice to the defendant's attorneys, where the Supreme Court held the trial
judge did not abuse his discretion. See also Bylund v.
Crook, 60 Utah 285, 208 Pac. 504 (1922), where the Court
held the matter to be within the trial judge's discretion
in not setting aside a default judgment.
In Warren, v. Dixon Ranch Co., 123 Utah 415, 260 P.
2d 741 (1953), the Court refused relief, where an employee of a corporation failed to respond to the summons
and answer, although the stockholders had no notice of
the action. An answer was filed on first notice 64 days
after default. 6 In this case, it will be recalled the Court
set the limits of the precedents that had accorded relief.
The Court said the case may he one in which it would have
accorded relief, but made it clear that the matter was for
the trial court's discretion saying:
"This court will not substitute its discretion for
that of the trial court in a case such as this.''
Chrysler v. Chrysler, 5 Utah 2d 415, 303 P. 2d 995
( 1956) is a case equally dispositive of the instant situa6

In the instant case, it was 42 days.
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tion. The appellant in that case sought a Nevada divorce, and claimed by affidavit that he had no notice of
the trial setting. In sustaining the trial court's denial of
relief, it was said:
''At the hearing upon the motion to set aside the
judgment neither plaintiff nor his Nevada attorney appeared for cross-examination upon the facts
alleged in their affidavits. His appeal seems to
proceed upon the assumption that the Court was
obliged to accept them as true, which is not the
case."
Further, the Court felt the record demonstrated
an intent not to pursue the Utah action. The Court said:
''Notwithstanding the policy of liberality in granting relief to persons against whom default judgments have been taken when there has been excusable neglect, inadvertence or surprise, it is
not to be forgotten that Rule 60 (b) under which
such relief is granted states that the Court may
relieve a party from a final judgment in the 'furtherance of justice.' Manifestly the Court should
not follow the rule of indulgence toward the party
in default when the effect would be to work an
injustice or inequity upon the opposing party. A
prime requisite precedent to the granting of such
relief is that the movamt demonstrate that he
comes to the Court with clean hands and in good
faith. His entire conduct as disclosed by the record negates this." (Emphasis supplied)
Judge Ellett, who denied the appellant's motion for
relief under Rule 60 (b), was the same judge who had
heard the testimony offered at the hearing on the judgment. Certainly he was not bound to accept the truthful-
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ness of the affidavit filed in support of the motion, where
the record fully disclosed testimony to refute it. Chrysler
v. Chrysler, supra. Further, he could, in the interest of
justice, refuse to grant the relief where not to have done
so would have worked an injustice on plaintiff. The record contains no findings of the trial court upon which its
denial was based, nor a record of the hearing, but in the
absence of such a record it must be assumed that the
order was supported by the evidence. In re Voorhees Estate, 12 Utah 2d 361, 366 P. 2d 977 (1961); Dahlberg v.
Dahlberg, 77 Utah 157, 292 Pac. 214 (1930). Since the
relief sought is equitable, to be accorded in the interest of
justice, based upon the fair discretion of the trial judge,
N ey v. Harrison, 5 Utah 2d 217, 299 P. 2d 1114 (1956), it
could harly be deemed an abuse of discretion to deny
relief where plaintiff had endeavored to seek settlement
prior to trial and defendant had been recalcitrant and
refused to assist ; where no answer was filed although
personal service was achieved; where subsequent to default, the' defendant's counsel acknowledged the action,
admitted the need to file an answer, was apprised that
plaintiff would be brought from Washington to testify
for judgment unless action was taken, and thereafter did
nothing; where judgment was taken after full hearing;
where the time from notice of default till the motion to
vacate was over a month's time; where the affidavit in
support of the motion was in opposition to testimony received at hearing; and finally, where plaintiff was put
to the expense of traveling from Seattle to Salt Lake City
to testify, plus the expenses of other witnesses being
called and a full hearing being held. To allow the appel16
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lant relief would punish the respondent for being diligent in the prosecution of the case, for abiding by the
rules of procedure, and being fair in her treatment of
the appellant. Only stark injustice would be the result,
and the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in refusing
to tolerate such a situation.
Finally, it should he noted that several federal cases
have made relief, in part, dependent upon the absence of
intervening equities. Bridaux v. Eastern .Air Lines, Inc.,
19 F. R. Serv. 60 h. 29 Case 2, 214 F. 2d 207 (1954) ;
Ellington v. Milne, 18 F. R. Serv. 60 b. 24 Case 1 (1953).
A similar rule seems to follow from Warren v. Dixon
Ranch Co., 123 Utah 416, 260 P. 2d 741 (1953). In the
instant case, it is submitted that since during appeal the
respondent has regained possession of the premises, 7 and
made payments on the mortgage on the property, that
this is another equity, which has intervened, warranting
affirmance of the trial court's decision.
It is submitted the Court should affirm the lower
Court's order in the interest of justice.
(B) Mistake, Inadvertence, Surprise, or Excusable Neg-

lect Was Nat Shown Such as to Warrant Relief
The sole basis for the claim for relief urged by the
appellant, is that appellant's attorney thought that an
answer had been filed, when it fact, none was filed. It is
submitted that under Utah decisions, the neglect of the
attorney of this nature will not suffice to warrant relief.
The facts set out in the affidavit of appellant's attorney
7

Defendant failed to file a supersedeas bond on appeal. See Appendix.
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are almost identical with the facts in Ledwith v. Stotkan,
6 F. R. Serv. 60 h. 24, Case 2, 2 FRD 530 (1942). In that
case, the Federal Court refused relief saying:
"It is manifest that facts here do not involve
either mistake or surprise. If relief may be granted at all it must rest either upon 'inadvertence'
or 'excusable neglect.'

* * *
''It may be added that while inadvertence and neglect are not precisely identical in their cannotations they are often classified as synonymous ...
And :finally, though in the rule, and in the statutes
underlying it, the word 'excusable' does not precede the word 'inadvertence' the pertinent decisions deny relief on the ground of inadvertence
unless it is actually excusable.
''Precisely what circumstances will avail to render the neglect of counsel excusable may not be
adequately set down. But some measure of excusability may be gotten from decisions where relief has been granted. They include (a) continuous preoccupation with the trial of a distracting
:first degree murder case, (b) reliance on assurance by the Court or a clerk thereof or opposing
counsel as to the time of trial, (c) Failure to reach
the place of trial in consequence of casual ties in
traffic, (d) sudden illness of counsel, (e) unanticipated summons to the bedside of a dying relative,
and other like incidents. In each instance there
was inadvertence or neglect which intercepted
the timely performance of a required act, but
there was likewise some disturbing and distracting
events which rendered the error excusable.
''Inevitably, the argument of the defendant must
proceed to the point where they assert, that having
employed counsel for the protection of their inter-
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ests, they did all that could be expected of them
and are entitled to absolution from responsibility
for their attorney's negligence. But that seems not
to be a tenable position, for by the weight of authority the negligence of counsel in this behalf
is imputed to his client."
The Utah cases have followed the same reasoning.
Thus, in Peterson v. Crosier, 29 Utah 235, 81 Pac. 860
(1905) at p. 245, the Court held that the negligence of
defendant's attorney was no excuse where the attorney
failed to appear. See infra p. 13. In Salt Lake Hardware
Co. v. Neilson, La;nd & Water Co., 43 Utah 406, 134 Pac.
911 ( 1913), the Court again refused relief where the basis
was an attorney's neglect.
A substantial number of federal cases have said that
where an attorney, without other reason, does not file
an answer so that default is taken that relief is not necessarily to be given from a judgment. Rutla;nd Tra;nsit
Compa.ny v. Chicago TU~Y~N~,el Terminal Co., 233 F. 2d 655
(1956); Pittsburgh Consolidation Coal Co. v. Dalrymple,
24 FRD 260 (D.C. Pa., 1959); Federal Enterprises, Inc.
v. Frank Allbritton Motors, Inc., 16 FRD 109 (D. C. Mo.,
1954); Frank v. New Amsterda.m Casualty Co., 27 FRD
258 (D. C. Pa., 1961).

The same rule is accepted by the Restatement of
Judgments, § 126 (f), which states that equitable relief
from a judgment will be denied where :
"the negligence of the attorney, agent, trustee or
other representative of the present complainant
prevented a fair trial.''
19
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The same conclusion for mistake of counsel is found
in the same section, subsection (e). In commenting on
relief from judgments, the Restatement of Judgments, p.
616, gives the following example under Section 126 (f):
"7. A brings an action against B who notifies his
attorney, C, to defend the case. C negligently forgets to defend the case for B and judgment is
given for A by default. Neither B nor C learn of
the judgment until it is too late to take further
proceedings in the action. Equitable relief will not
be gra.n,ted." (Emphasis supplied)
In Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co., 123 Utah 416, 260 P.
2d 741, 743 (1953), Section 126 of the Restatement of

Judgments was cited with approval.
It is submitted therefore that even if the appellant's
attorney's affidavit were correct in all particulars that
appellant would not be entitled to relief, and where the
fact of contradicting testimony is considered, it is clear
there was not abuse of discretion in denying relief under
Rule 60 (b), U. R. C. P.

CONCLUSION
The appellant's position that relief should be granted under Rule 60 (b) is not sustainable under the facts
of this case. The instant situation is far more aggravated
than those wherein the Courts have reversed the trial
judge. Taking into consideration the equities, it appears
20
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clear that an injustice will result unless the trial court
is affirmed. Certainly it cannot be said that there was an
abuse of discretion.
Respectfully Submitted,

RONALD N. BOYCE,
Attorney for Plaintiff
and Respondent
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APPENDIX
AFFIDAVIT
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE }
STATE OF UTAH
_ ss.
I, Ronald N. Boyce, attorney for Mrs. Audrey E.
Masters, do depose and swear that subsequent to the
judgment of the Third Judicial District Court in the
case of Audrey E. Masters v. Maxine LeSeuer, and while
the same was pending on appeal before the Utah Supreme
Court as Case No. 957 4, the plaintiff took possession of
the premises at 603-604 Cortez Street, Salt Lake City,
State of Utah, sometime in the last part of the month of
January, 1962. This was done since the defendant, Maxine LeSeuer did not desire to file a supersedeas bond on
appeal.
Since that time, to the best of my knowledge and
upon information and belief, any rents from the rental
of the premises have been applied to the mortgage against
said property.
/S/ RONALD N. BOYCE
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 7th day of
May, 1962.
(SEAL)

/S/ DAVID K. WINDER
Notary Public
Residing at Salt Lake City, Utah

My Commission Expires: April 16, 1963.
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